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Why does the Mishna say "kinidrei sheirim lo yomar klum" when the Rambam (רמב"ם) holds that righteous people do make vows to improve their character? The shiur develops the yesod that "kinidrei sheirim" is a kinui (substitute language for issur), not a yad (pointing device), and cannot function as valid kinui because tzaddikim rarely make such vows—unlike "kinidrei reshaim" where the language itself creates issur.
This intricate Gemara (גמרא) shiur on Nedarim addresses a fundamental contradiction between the Mishna's ruling that "kinidrei sheirim lo yomar klum" (vows like those of righteous people have no effect) and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s explicit statement in Hilchos Nedarim 13:23 that righteous people do make vows of prohibition—specifically to improve their character or actions. The Rambam writes that one who was gluttonous with meat may prohibit meat upon himself, or one who drinks excessively may prohibit wine—and doing so is "noam meshubach" (praiseworthy). How then can the Mishna declare such vows ineffective? The shiur begins by reviewing the Ran's position that the novelty of "kinidrei sheirim lo yomar klum" lies in cases where someone says "hareini alai imenu" regarding an item lying before him (nosar lefanav). The Ran argues this cannot be the Rambam's understanding because the Rambam introduces this halacha (הלכה) before discussing the concept of nosar lefanav in his legal code. Therefore, according to the Rambam, there must be a distinct chiddush in "kinidrei sheirim" independent of the nosar lefanav requirement.
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Nedarim 12a
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