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Does kiddushin require the woman's active affirmation, or is her passive acceptance sufficient? The Gemara (גמרא) explores cases where a woman throws away money, gives it to her father, or accepts it under unclear circumstances. Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) debate whether kiddushin is a unilateral act requiring only the absence of rejection (Rashi) or a bilateral agreement requiring the woman's clear assent (Tosafos).
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 8b–9a, focusing on the fundamental nature of kinyan kiddushin and the role of the woman's acceptance. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a series of cases that test whether kiddushin requires the woman's active affirmation or whether her passive acceptance—the absence of rejection—is sufficient. The shiur begins with the case of a woman who throws the kiddushin money into the sea. The Gemara initially suggests that perhaps she is testing the man's temper to see if he is a "raschan" (quick-tempered), and therefore the kiddushin might still be valid since she doesn't intend to reject him outright. The Gemara ultimately rejects this, teaching that we need to see some form of acceptance from the woman for kiddushin to take effect. This leads to a fundamental question: Is kiddushin a unilateral act performed by the man (with the woman merely passive), or is it a bilateral agreement requiring her active participation?
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Kiddushin 8b-9a
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