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What is the issur of lo titgodedu—is it a prohibition against excessive mourning (aveilus yoter midai) or a chukot ha'akum prohibition against imitating gentile practices? The Ramban (רמב"ן) and Rosh disagree on whether there's a meaningful distinction between making a cut (srita) versus hitting oneself (hakah), reflecting fundamentally different understandings of the prohibition's nature.
This shiur provides a deep analysis of the prohibition of lo titgodedu, exploring the fundamental nature of the issur through the lens of a dispute between the Ramban (רמב"ן) and the Rosh. The Gemara (גמרא) in Yevamos 13b discusses the issur of lo sasu chabura al mes (making a wound on oneself for the dead), which appears both as lo titgodedu and in connection with mourning practices. The central question is why Tosafos (תוספות) only asks about the specific issur of chabura al mes rather than addressing the general prohibition against wounding oneself. The Ramban distinguishes between srita (cutting) and hakah (hitting). According to the Ramban, the Torah (תורה)'s prohibition is specifically against srita—a deliberate act of cutting oneself—but not against hakah, which may result in cuts but is done in a different manner. The Rosh challenges this distinction, arguing that since the Torah prohibits srita both when done by hand (b'yad) and with an instrument (b'kli), there should be no difference between different methods that produce the same result. The Beit Yosef further sharpens this question: if the Torah explicitly discusses srita, why would we extend it to other forms?
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Yevamos 13b
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