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What is the issur of lo titgodedu—is it a prohibition against excessive mourning (aveilus yoter midai) or a chukot ha'akum prohibition against imitating gentile practices? The Ramban (רמב"ן) and Rosh disagree on whether there's a meaningful distinction between making a cut (srita) versus hitting oneself (hakah), reflecting fundamentally different understandings of the prohibition's nature.
This shiur provides a deep analysis of the prohibition of lo titgodedu, exploring the fundamental nature of the issur through the lens of a dispute between the Ramban (רמב"ן) and the Rosh. The Gemara (גמרא) in Yevamos 13b discusses the issur of lo sasu chabura al mes (making a wound on oneself for the dead), which appears both as lo titgodedu and in connection with mourning practices. The central question is why Tosafos (תוספות) only asks about the specific issur of chabura al mes rather than addressing the general prohibition against wounding oneself. The Ramban distinguishes between srita (cutting) and hakah (hitting). According to the Ramban, the Torah (תורה)'s prohibition is specifically against srita—a deliberate act of cutting oneself—but not against hakah, which may result in cuts but is done in a different manner. The Rosh challenges this distinction, arguing that since the Torah prohibits srita both when done by hand (b'yad) and with an instrument (b'kli), there should be no difference between different methods that produce the same result. The Beit Yosef further sharpens this question: if the Torah explicitly discusses srita, why would we extend it to other forms?
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Yevamos 13b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
