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Why does kiddushin require actual kesef and not shaveh kesef (equivalent value)? The shiur explores Tosfos's fundamental question: whether the limitation stems from shaveh kesef lacking intrinsic value, or from the ritual requirement of a constant, unchanging object. This analysis contrasts Tosfos's approach with other Rishonim and examines how klal u'prat u'klal and the principle of lidei shaveh create value.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Tosfos on Kiddushin 2a regarding the principle of shaveh kesef k'kesef (items equivalent in value to money being treated as money). The fundamental question is why we need a special limud to know that shaveh kesef works for kiddushin, eved ivri, and other ritual contexts. Rabbi Zweig begins with a basic question on Tosfos: If we learn kiddushin from the kinyan of karka (real estate), and by karka itself shaveh kesef works (as we see from the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion), why would Tosfos suggest that kiddushin should require actual kesef and not shaveh kesef? The very source from which we learn—karka—already demonstrates that shaveh kesef is valid. Furthermore, Tosfos brings proof from eved ivri that we need a pasuk for shaveh kesef, yet he seems to overlook the explicit klal u'prat u'klal by pidyon haben that already teaches this principle.
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Kiddushin 2a
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