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Why can eidei chasima (signature witnesses) serve as eidei mesira (delivery witnesses) for a get but not for kiddushin? The shiur builds a yesod that eidei chasima can substitute for eidei mesira only when the witnesses testify on a completed act of kinyan—as in gerushin or shichrur, where the husband's ksiva completes the act. By kiddushin, the husband's writing accomplishes nothing without the woman's consent and acceptance, so the witnesses testify on no kinyan at all.
The shiur opens with a close reading of Tosafos (תוספות) on Gittin 4a, which discusses whether eidei chasima (witnesses who sign a document) can serve as eidei mesira (witnesses to the delivery). Tosafos brings a dispute: according to Rabbeinu Tam, even Rabbeinu Yitzchok requires eidei mesira in addition to eidei chasima, and even Rabbi Meir requires eidei mesira. The shiur examines Tosafos's statement that for shtar kinyan and shtar mecher (documents of acquisition and sale), there is a principle that "hoda'as ba'aldin k'me'eidim"—the admission of the parties is like witnesses—and that eidei chasima can work "bemakom hoda'as ba'aldin" (in place of admission). Two readings of this Tosafos emerge. The Sma and the Shach hold that if there is hoda'as ba'aldin (the seller admits he wrote and delivered the document), it is valid even without kosher eidei chasima. The Sois and the Bach disagree, holding that you need eidei chasima plus hoda'as ba'aldin—the admission alone is insufficient. The practical difference arises when the eidei chasima are disqualified (e.g., relatives): according to the Sma/Shach, hoda'as ba'aldin saves the document; according to the Sois/Bach, it does not.
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Gittin 4a
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