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Can a woman be mekudeshes using "charufasi" (language from Yehuda meaning betrothed woman) in other regions? The Gemara (גמרא)'s tension: if it's loshen hakodesh from the pasuk, why does it only work in Yehuda where people speak that way? The shiur develops the machlokes between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) on whether kedushin language must describe marriage itself or merely require marriage as a prerequisite.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 6a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of what language is valid for creating kiddushin (betrothal). The central case is whether saying "charufasi" (a term used in Yehuda meaning "my betrothed one") can effect kiddushin in other regions where this term is not commonly used. The Gemara presents a fundamental tension: The word "charufa" appears in the Torah (תורה)'s discussion of shifcha charufa (a maidservant betrothed to someone), which according to some opinions requires kiddushin. This would suggest it's loshen hakodesh (Biblical Hebrew) that should work universally. Yet the Gemara limits its validity to Yehuda, where people actually use this language. The question is: if we have a source in the pasuk, why should we need people to speak that way? And conversely, if it's only valid where people speak that way (Yehuda), how can it work elsewhere - "Yehuda hav'yaruba d'alma" (Yehuda is not the majority of the world)?
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Kiddushin 6a
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