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When does a husband's claim that a get is forged create only a sofeik megureshes versus a vadai ein megureshes (child mamzer)? The shiur analyzes the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s halachos 1-8 of Hilchos Geirushin perek 1, focusing on the tension between kiyum b'chosmo as a derabanan versus the Rambam's ruling of vadai mamzer, and grapples with the structure and scope of halacha (הלכה) 7's puzzling placement.
This shiur analyzes Gittin 3a and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s Hilchos Geirushin, focusing on the laws of kiyum b'chosmo (validating a get through signature verification) and the status of a woman when her husband claims the get is forged (mezuyaf). The Rambam in Hilchos Geirushin 1:2 rules that when a shliach brings a get from place to place within Eretz Yisrael, even if he did not witness the writing and signing, the woman is megureshes and permitted to remarry. However, if the husband comes and claims "lo girashti me'olam" (I never divorced her) and the get cannot be verified through kiyum b'chosmo, the Rambam rules "teitzei v'havlad mamzer she'areinu megureshes" — she must leave both men and the child is a mamzer because she is definitively not divorced. The shiur notes this is remarkable: the Rambam doesn't simply say "ein megureshes" but rules vadai mamzer, treating this as a definitive prohibition, not merely a safek.
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Gittin 3a
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