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Can a woman be acquired through debt forgiveness (mechilah) in place of giving money? The Gemara (גמרא) examines whether a bride can substitute herself for an existing debt owed to her, exploring the fundamental difference between ownership acquisition and relationship-based kiddushin. The shiur develops the principle that kiddushin is not a purchase transaction—the woman does not exchange herself—which is why certain forms of monetary transfer may not effect kiddushin.
The shiur analyzes Kiddushin 7b, focusing on a fundamental question in the laws of marriage: can a man be mekadesh (marry) a woman through debt forgiveness (mechilah)? The case discussed involves a man who owes a woman money; can he marry her by saying, "Be married to me through the forgiveness of my debt to you," thereby having her forgo the debt in place of receiving actual money for kiddushin? Rabbi Zweig examines Rashi (רש"י)'s position that such kiddushin would not be valid because the woman "does not want to exchange herself" (ein adam rotzeh lehachlif atzmo). This principle, learned from the case of Ephron selling his field to Avrohom, establishes that a person does not want to substitute themselves in place of an obligation. The question emerges: why should we learn this principle specifically from the Ephron narrative, and what does it teach us about the nature of kiddushin?
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Kiddushin 7b
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