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When a man betroths a woman saying "be betrothed with fifty dollars" and gives her an object worth fifty, does she need an appraisal beforehand? Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation hinges on the distinction between betrothal with money versus an object: shevat kesef (the value of money) can only substitute for actual kesef when the woman knows its ascertainable value and accepts it as currency, creating the necessary smichat da'at (reliance).
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Kiddushin 8a-b, focusing on the fundamental dispute between Rabba and Rav Yosef regarding whether a woman can be betrothed with an object whose value has not been appraised beforehand. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses two distinct cases: first, where a man says "be betrothed to me with fifty dollars" and gives her an object worth fifty (hitkadshi b'chamishim), and second, where he says "be betrothed to me with this" which happens to be worth fifty (hitkadshi b'zu). Rabbi Zweig develops Rashi (רש"י)'s unique approach to this sugya. According to Rashi, the fundamental question is whether shevat kesef (an object with monetary value) can substitute for actual kesef (money) in creating kiddushin. Rashi distinguishes between two types of betrothal: when one explicitly betrothes with money (hitkadshi b'chamishim), an appraisal is required beforehand; when one betrothes with "this object" that happens to be worth fifty, no prior appraisal is needed. The Gemara's case of "kol'du" (unspecified object) is understood by Rashi to mean hitkadshi b'pruta—betrothing with a pruta's worth—which also requires appraisal to establish that it meets even that minimal threshold.
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Kiddushin 8a-b
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