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Does an asei push aside a lav she'eino shel bechol? The Gemara (גמרא) examines whether a positive commandment (metzora's shaving) can override prohibitions that don't apply to everyone (kohanim's prohibition on rounding the beard). The shiur traces the logical structure: we know asei docheh lo sa'aseh from shatnez, then explores whether kohanim—who face additional restrictions—represent a more stringent category that might resist being pushed aside.
This shiur analyzes Yevamos 5a, continuing the Gemara (גמרא)'s exploration of the principle that a positive commandment (asei) can override a negative prohibition (lo sa'aseh). The specific case examines whether the metzora's obligation to shave all his hair—including his beard and sideburns—overrides the prohibition against shaving, particularly for kohanim who have additional restrictions. The Gemara begins with the fundamental question according to Rabbanun: how do we know that an asei is docheh (pushes aside) a lo sa'aseh? Rabbi Zweig explains that the original source is from shatnez—the prohibition against wearing wool and linen together—which is overridden by the positive commandment of tzitzis. This establishes the basic principle. However, the Gemara encountered a problem: according to Rabbi Yehuda, we don't generally derive laws from semuchin (juxtaposed verses). The resolution was that even Rabbi Yehuda would agree when it's "muft me'umchak" (explicitly needed), and this is supported by the view of Tana D'vei Rabbi Shmuel.
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Yevamos 5a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
