No community start suggestion yet.
When false witnesses claim someone stole and should be sold as an eved ivri, what punishment do they receive? The Rambam (רמב"ם) holds they only pay money since theft creates a monetary obligation, not a status change. The Tur argues they always get malkos because selling for theft is a punishment (onesh), making them eidim she'eino yecholim lachazor.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental machlokes between the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Tur regarding the punishment for eidim zomemin who testify that someone stole and should be sold as an eved ivri. The Gemara (גמרא) in Makkos 2b discusses whether these false witnesses receive malkos or pay money, and whether it matters if they have money to pay. The Rambam in Hilchos Eidus holds that when someone steals, the primary obligation is monetary payment (chiyuv mamon). Sale as an eved ivri is merely a method of collection when the thief cannot pay, not a separate punishment. Therefore, when eidim zomemin falsely testify about theft, they receive the same monetary obligation - they must pay money, not receive malkos. The Rambam reads the Gemara's conclusion as establishing that there is no independent din of mechira (sale) for theft.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Makkos 2b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
