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When two people dig a pit sequentially—one digs six tefachim, another adds to seven—who is liable for damage? The shiur contrasts Tosafos (תוספות) and the Shita Mekubetzes on whether the second digger is always liable (siluk ma'aseh rishon) or only when achieving shem mitah status. The Gemara (גמרא)'s two lashonot on the ten-twenty-thirty case anchor the machlokes.
This shiur on Bava Kamma 10a-b continues the analysis of "hechsharti bemiktzas nizko" (partial causation of damage), focusing on the case where multiple people sequentially contribute to digging a pit. The core question is: when does the Torah (תורה) hold the second digger liable for the entire damage, and when are both liable? Rabbi Zweig begins by reviewing yesterday's sugya: the Gemara (גמרא) could have cited the case of ten-twenty-thirty (where one person digs ten tefachim, another adds ten more, and a third adds another ten) as an example of partial causation liability, just as it cited the case of nine-to-ten. The Shita Mekubetzes (citing Rabbeinu Yonasan) suggests the Gemara could have used that case, but Tosafos (תוספות) on daf 11a holds that in the ten-twenty-thirty scenario, both diggers would be liable because neither went from "not a shem mitah" to "shem mitah." Tosafos maintains that acharon chayav (the last one is liable) applies specifically when the second person creates shem mitah status where the first did not.
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Bava Kamma 10a-b
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