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Why is "harei at mekudeshes" (without "li") invalid even when the intention is obvious? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: kiddushin requires the husband to *take* the woman—she must follow his lead, not decide to marry him. This transforms how we understand the entire structure of kiddushin communication and resolves the Rosh's difficulty with umdana and yad.
This shiur on Kiddushin 5b-6a addresses a fundamental question about the language requirements of kiddushin. The Gemara (גמרא) and Shulchan Aruch rule that "harei at mekudeshes" (without the word "li"—to me) is invalid. The Beit Yosef cites the Mabit and Tashbatz who say that even if the couple is engaged, has shidduchim, and broke a plate together, the formula "harei at mekudeshes" still doesn't create kiddushin. This is extraordinarily difficult: how could this be worse than asu kinyan inyan (relying on earlier conversation without any verbal formula at all)? If silence with prior context works, why doesn't explicit language with obvious context work? Rabbi Zweig begins by establishing that there are different ways speech functions in halacha (הלכה). Sometimes speech merely concretizes a mental decision—turning a thought into a final commitment. Other times, the words themselves have intrinsic creative power, as in nedarim and nezirut. The Rambam (רמב"ם) in Hilchot Nezirut and Hilchot Nedarim reveals a crucial distinction: for nezirut, a yad (ambiguous language) that is only 10-20% likely to mean nezirut is sufficient, whereas for nedarim, the language must be at least 51% mashma (indicative) of the intended meaning. This difference reflects that nezirut concerns concretizing an internal commitment through speech, while nedarim requires the words themselves to create an objective halachic reality.
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Kiddushin 5b-6a
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