No community start suggestion yet.
Why are you liable if a mentally incompetent person or child unties your ox or opens your pit after you entrusted them to watch it? The Gemara (גמרא) explores whether a cheresh shoteh v'katan acts like a normal force (ruach matzuya) or whether giving them responsibility itself creates the problem. Tosafos (תוספות) develops that while children don't naturally cause mischief, once made guardians they may ruin the shemirah by trying too hard to improve it.
This shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 22b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of liability when one entrusts property to a cheresh, shoteh, or katan (a deaf-mute, mentally incompetent person, or minor). The core question is: why does the Torah (תורה) hold you liable when such a person unties your ox or opens your pit after you appointed them as guardian? The Gemara distinguishes between shor (ox) and bor (pit) versus gacheles (coals). Tosafos (תוספות) explains that an ox and pit are "dark lintuke al yedei cheires" – it is normal for a cheresh to untie them – whereas it's not normal (ein derech) for a cheresh to blow on coals to make them flare up. The shiur questions why this distinction matters: if a cheresh shoteh v'katan is like a ruach matzuya (common natural force), you should be liable regardless of whether you appointed them, just as you're liable if you leave something where a common wind can damage it.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Bava Kamma 22b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
