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Must a husband verbally declare his intent when giving a get? The shiur analyzes four major Rishonim positions: Tosafos (תוספות) requires the wife to know, Baal HaMaor requires the husband to know, Ramban (רמב"ן) requires verbal transmission, and Raavad holds there's no amira requirement—only a prohibition against bitul. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position is scrutinized: amira is only derabbanan, but the maaseh geirushin must be done b'toras geirushin midoraisa.
This shiur on Gittin 78a examines the fundamental question of whether verbal declaration (amira) is required when delivering a get. The Gemara (גמרא)'s Mishna presents a case where a husband gives his wife a shtar chov (loan document) instead of a get, and the ensuing discussion raises the question of what role speech plays in the divorce process. The shiur begins by outlining four major Rishonim positions on this issue. Tosafos (תוספות) holds that the wife must know that she is being divorced (das). The Baal HaMaor takes the opposite approach: the husband must understand what he is doing, and as long as witnesses know that he knows, it is valid. The Ramban (רמב"ן), based on the Sifrei, holds that there is a requirement of maaseh shlichus—the husband must verbally transmit the message of divorce to the wife, derived from the pasuk "v'shalcha mi'beiso." The Raavad maintains there is no requirement of amira at all; the only issue is whether the get was batul (nullified).
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Gittin 78a
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