No community start suggestion yet.
Must a husband verbally declare his intent when giving a get? The shiur analyzes four major Rishonim positions: Tosafos (תוספות) requires the wife to know, Baal HaMaor requires the husband to know, Ramban (רמב"ן) requires verbal transmission, and Raavad holds there's no amira requirement—only a prohibition against bitul. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position is scrutinized: amira is only derabbanan, but the maaseh geirushin must be done b'toras geirushin midoraisa.
This shiur on Gittin 78a examines the fundamental question of whether verbal declaration (amira) is required when delivering a get. The Gemara (גמרא)'s Mishna presents a case where a husband gives his wife a shtar chov (loan document) instead of a get, and the ensuing discussion raises the question of what role speech plays in the divorce process. The shiur begins by outlining four major Rishonim positions on this issue. Tosafos (תוספות) holds that the wife must know that she is being divorced (das). The Baal HaMaor takes the opposite approach: the husband must understand what he is doing, and as long as witnesses know that he knows, it is valid. The Ramban (רמב"ן), based on the Sifrei, holds that there is a requirement of maaseh shlichus—the husband must verbally transmit the message of divorce to the wife, derived from the pasuk "v'shalcha mi'beiso." The Raavad maintains there is no requirement of amira at all; the only issue is whether the get was batul (nullified).
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Gittin 78a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
