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When a man betroths a woman with an object (like silk garments), must he specify its exact value, or is saying "with whatever they are worth" (kol du) sufficient? The Gemara (גמרא) presents a dispute between Rav and Rav Yosef about whether betrothal is valid when the stated value doesn't match reality. The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י)'s two interpretations and explores the concept of smichas das—the woman's genuine consent based on accurate expectations.
The shiur examines Kiddushin 7b, focusing on a critical case: a man betroths a woman using silk garments (shiroi) with a stated value. The central machloket is between Rav (who holds lo tzrich ishuma—no appraisal is needed) and Rav Yosef (who holds tzrich ishuma—an appraisal is required). The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that when the man says "bekol du" (with whatever they are worth), both agree the betrothal is valid. The dispute arises when he assigns a specific monetary value to the object. Rashi (רש"י) presents two interpretations. In his first explanation, Rashi indicates that "bekol du" requires actually saying those words (or something equivalent like "behen" or "kemosha hen"). The person must explicitly indicate that he is betrothing her with the object at its actual worth, whatever that may be. Without such language, there would be grounds for dispute. The question arises: what exactly constitutes saying "kol du"? Does it mean literally those words, or any formulation that conveys the concept of "whatever this is worth"?
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Kiddushin 7b
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