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Why did Rava refuse to accept back his stolen rams, even though he held that stolen items should be returned? The analysis reveals that Rava deferred to Rav's opposing view out of respect, but this creates questions about heavenly obligations versus court obligations. The shiur uses this to clarify when tefeisa (seizure) works in Kim Li D'Rabbanan cases.
The shiur analyzes a Gemara (גמרא) in Sanhedrin 72a about Rava, who had rams stolen from him through a tunnel (machteresh). When the thief wanted to return them, Rava refused to accept them back, even though he held that stolen items should be returned. This created a puzzle: why didn't Rava take advantage of the principles that would allow him to keep the items? The Gemara explains that Rava's refusal was based on his deference to Rav's opinion that stolen items belong to the thief (Adam Kanu). Even though Rava disagreed with this position, he chose to act according to Rav's view out of respect. Tosafot raises a critical question: even if there's a dispute about human court obligations (dinei adam), shouldn't there still be an obligation from Heaven (chov d'Shamayim) that would justify Rava's acceptance?
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Sanhedrin 72a
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