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Why does the Torah (תורה) need both prohibitions of shatnez — "lo yilbash" (wearing) and "lo ya'aleh alecha" (deriving benefit)? The Gemara (גמרא)'s derivation that mochreich sus (a merchant displaying shatnez) is permitted creates a fundamental difficulty: Rashi (רש"י) explains it's mutar because of davar she'eino miskavein, yet Rav Yehuda (whose position the Gemara is explaining) holds davar she'eino miskavein is forbidden.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental Gemara (גמרא) in Yevamos 4a concerning the prohibition of shatnez (wool and linen mixture). The Gemara opens with a drasha asking why the Torah (תורה) needs two separate prohibitions: "lo yilbash shatnez" (you shall not wear shatnez) and "lo ya'aleh alecha" (it shall not come upon you). The Gemara explains that if we only had "lo yilbash," we would understand only actual wearing is forbidden, but hana'ah (deriving benefit) would be permitted. Conversely, if we only had "lo ya'aleh alecha," we might think even mochreich sus (a merchant displaying the garment on his shoulder to show customers) would be prohibited. The Gemara concludes that lemaaseh, mochreich sus is mutar (permitted). Rashi (רש"י) explains the reasoning: the merchant does not have kavanah for hana'ah (intention to derive benefit from the shatnez itself), and therefore it is permitted. This explanation introduces the principle of davar she'eino miskavein — an unintended consequence of one's action.
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Yevamos 4a
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