A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Why does the Torah (תורה) need both prohibitions of shatnez — "lo yilbash" (wearing) and "lo ya'aleh alecha" (deriving benefit)? The Gemara (גמרא)'s derivation that mochreich sus (a merchant displaying shatnez) is permitted creates a fundamental difficulty: Rashi (רש"י) explains it's mutar because of davar she'eino miskavein, yet Rav Yehuda (whose position the Gemara is explaining) holds davar she'eino miskavein is forbidden.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental Gemara (גמרא) in Yevamos 4a concerning the prohibition of shatnez (wool and linen mixture). The Gemara opens with a drasha asking why the Torah (תורה) needs two separate prohibitions: "lo yilbash shatnez" (you shall not wear shatnez) and "lo ya'aleh alecha" (it shall not come upon you). The Gemara explains that if we only had "lo yilbash," we would understand only actual wearing is forbidden, but hana'ah (deriving benefit) would be permitted. Conversely, if we only had "lo ya'aleh alecha," we might think even mochreich sus (a merchant displaying the garment on his shoulder to show customers) would be prohibited. The Gemara concludes that lemaaseh, mochreich sus is mutar (permitted). Rashi (רש"י) explains the reasoning: the merchant does not have kavanah for hana'ah (intention to derive benefit from the shatnez itself), and therefore it is permitted. This explanation introduces the principle of davar she'eino miskavein — an unintended consequence of one's action.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Yevamos 4a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
