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Does a woman become married at the beginning or completion of marital relations? The Gemara (גמרא)'s debate between techilat biah kona and sof biah kona raises fundamental questions about the legal definition of biah versus a person's intention. The analysis explores Rashi (רש"י)'s position that this applies only to eirusin (not nisuin), contrasts Tosafot with the Rashba and Rivash on whether prisha (withdrawal) alone creates kiddushin, and examines the puzzling nafka mina regarding a kohen gadol.
This shiur provides an extensive analysis of the Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 10a, which discusses the fundamental question of whether kiddushin (betrothal) takes effect at the beginning of marital relations (techilat biah kona) or only at the completion (sof biah kona). The discussion centers on understanding what exactly the Gemara's question is asking and what its practical ramifications are. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s position that the Gemara's question only applies to eirusin (betrothal), not to nisuin (marriage). Rashi distinguishes between kiddushin and nisuin, suggesting that while the debate exists regarding eirusin, nisuin is acquired from the beginning. This raises important questions about whether one can create nisuin before eirusin, which the Ritva and Mishneh Melech discuss. The Mishneh Melech suggests that in certain cases, particularly with a cheresh (deaf-mute), one might be able to create chupah before kiddushin.
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Kiddushin 10a
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