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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) reject learning kesef kiddushin from shtar and biah based on the distinction that they work bal korach while kesef does not? The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י)'s position that bal korach refers to the girl herself versus Tosafos (תוספות) who argues it means bal korach of the father. A fundamental yesod emerges: by amah ivriya, kesef creates ownership (shifcha status) while yiud creates ishus—two separate components of kiddushin that normally work together but here function independently.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental sugya in Kiddushin 5a concerning the concept of bal korach (against one's will) in different forms of kiddushin. The Gemara (גמרא) attempts to learn kesef kiddushin from shtar and biah, but rejects this because those two methods work bal korach while kesef does not. However, the Gemara then cites amah ivriya where kesef does work bal korach through the mechanism of yiud. Rashi (רש"י) explains that bal korach refers to the girl being acquired against her will. Tosafos (תוספות) raises a fundamental difficulty: if bal korach means the girl's will is irrelevant, then chupah should also be bal korach, yet the Gemara later tries to learn chupah from the other kinyanim and rejects it because chupah is not bal korach while the others are. Tosafos answers that bal korach must refer to the father's consent (daas ha'av), not the girl's. By amah ivriya, the father sold her for work, not for kiddushin, yet the Torah (תורה) gave the master (adon) the right to be miyayeid her without needing to go back to the father—this is bal korach of the father.
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Kiddushin 5a
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