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Why doesn't kinyan chalipin (acquiring through barter) work for kiddushin when the object is worth less than a perutah? The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot's approaches, distinguishing between chalipin as a symbolic transfer versus actual value transfer. The key distinction: when chalipin is merely symbolic holding (achiza) rather than actual acquisition, a woman won't consecrate herself for nothing of value.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Kiddushin 3a, focusing on the mechanics of kinyan chalipin (acquisition through barter) in the context of kiddushin (marriage). The central question is why chalipin doesn't work when the object transferred is worth less than a perutah (the minimum value), and what this reveals about the nature of different types of kinyanim. Rabbi Zweig begins by presenting Tosafot Rid's position: if you give a woman a handkerchief through kinyan chalipin with the intent that she be consecrated to you, the chalipin itself works as a valid kinyan mechanism. However, if you simultaneously stipulate that you will owe her money (e.g., $100) for marrying you, this doesn't work. This raises several questions: Should the handkerchief itself be sufficient through kinyan mo'il (a valid kinyan form working even when not optimal)? How do we understand the Gemara (גמרא)'s statement that "an isha (woman) is not makne herself for less than a perutah's worth"?
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Kiddushin 3a
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