A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Why does mitoch permit making wounds on Yom Tov but not burning incense, when both melachos are sometimes allowed for food preparation? The Gemara (גמרא) distinguishes between activities that are 'shaveh l'chol nefesh' (universally applicable) versus luxuries only practiced by the refined. The shiur suggests mitoch applies only to the four core ochel nefesh melachos in their typical food-related forms.
This shiur examines a complex sugya from Kesubos daf 7 dealing with the principle of mitoch on Yom Tov. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses Rav Papa's ruling that making a chabura (wound) on Yom Tov is permitted because of mitoch - since making a chabura is sometimes permitted for ochel nefesh (food needs), it should be permitted even when not for ochel nefesh. Rav Papi challenges this by asking why, according to this logic, burning incense (mogmar) shouldn't also be permitted through mitoch, since burning is allowed for cooking purposes. The Gemara resolves this by distinguishing between activities that are 'shaveh l'chol nefesh' (equally applicable to all people) versus those that are not. Burning incense is considered a luxury that only some people (mifunakim - refined individuals) engage in, whereas making a chabura for medical purposes is universally applicable. The shiur explores Tosafot's analysis of this distinction and examines whether mitoch applies based on how common an activity is (ragil vs. lo ragil).
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 7a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
