Gittin 8b: Amirah L'Akum, Shlichus, and Shvus L'Shvus for Mitzvos

The shiur begins by analyzing the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation in Hilchos Shabbos (Perek Beis, Halacha (הלכה) Alef) that forbids telling a non-Jew to perform work on Shabbos (שבת) "even though he is not commanded regarding Shabbos." The speaker raises a fundamental difficulty: according to the principle of yesh shlichus ledvar aveirah, there is agency for sin specifically when the shliach is not transgressing—divrei Rav v'divrei talmid, divrei mi shom'im? If it is permissible for the non-Jew to work, that should establish shlichus, making the Jew liable. The Rambam's "afilpi" (even though) language implies the opposite: that it being mutar for the non-Jew would be grounds to permit it, when logically it should be grounds to forbid it. The Rambam himself rules yesh shlichus l'akum l'chumra in Hilchos Malveh (ribbis), so the principle should apply here as well. The shiur proposes that shlichus means an action is attributed (mesuyachas) to the sender, but the character (ofei) of the action is determined by the person performing it. When a non-Jew performs melacha on Shabbos, it is not melacha at all—he is doing what he is supposed to do, fulfilling his obligation to engage in the world's creative work. The speaker illustrates this with the case of a goel ha'dam: if only the goel ha'dam may kill the rotzei'ach, and I tell the goel ha'dam to kill on my behalf, I should not become a rotzei'ach because by him it is a mitzvah (מצוה), not murder. Similarly, if I tell a kohen to eat terumah for me, I am not liable for eating terumah because by him it is a mitzvah. The Rambam's "afilpi" is therefore explained: precisely because it is mutar for the non-Jew—and thus not melacha in character—shlichus cannot transform it into melacha for the Jew. This is the opposite of the standard shlichus ledvar aveirah logic, and the speaker suggests this is why the Rambam does not invoke the language of shlichus but rather the rabbinic gezeirah of amirah l'akum.