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When someone sells a cow with the understanding that the buyer will pluck a fig from the seller's tree on Shabbos (שבת) as the kinyan, is the seller exempt from payment due to kam lei bidirabah minei? The Gemara (גמרא) explores whether the mechirah itself is invalidated because the kinyan involves chillul Shabbos, analyzing whether the Shabbos violation creates the obligation or merely marks its timing.
The shiur examines Bava Kama 70b, which discusses a case where someone says "pluck a fig from my tree and thereby acquire my cow." When the buyer plucks the fig on Shabbos (שבת), creating a chillul Shabbos violation, the question arises whether the seller is exempt from the double payment (kefel) obligation due to the principle of kam lei bidirabah minei—when someone is liable for both capital punishment and monetary payment for the same act, the capital punishment exempts him from the monetary obligation. The Gemara (גמרא) initially suggests that since the mechirah involves chillul Shabbos (which carries a capital penalty), there should be no payment obligation. However, the Gemara then challenges this: if there's kam lei bidirabah minei, perhaps there's no valid mechirah at all. The reasoning is that kinyan kesef (monetary acquisition) works by creating an obligation on the recipient to return the money or provide something in exchange. But if the seller received something through an act that carries capital punishment, he has no obligation to return it (since he'd be exempt due to kam lei), and therefore the mechanics of kinyan kesef cannot function. Without a valid kinyan, this isn't a sale of stolen property (ganov umachar) but rather nothing at all.
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Bava Kama 70b
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