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When does the principle of hakashas klal hazaman (global contradiction nullifying testimony) apply in monetary cases versus capital cases? The shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 64b, exploring when witnesses who testified about knocking out a slave's tooth versus eye are considered zomemin (conspiring witnesses), examining whether the court's financial ruling remains valid even after the testimony is impeached, and how this relates to whether hakashas klal hazaman creates a more stringent standard in monetary cases than in capital cases.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Bava Kamma 64b dealing with eidim zomemin (conspiring witnesses) in the context of a master injuring his slave. The core discussion centers on when witnesses are deemed zomemin and what payment obligations result from their false testimony, particularly in cases involving contradictory testimony about which body part was injured. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a case where one set of witnesses testifies that a master knocked out his slave's tooth and eye (shen v'ayin), while a second set testifies the reverse occurred (ayin v'shen). Since knocking out a tooth or eye grants the slave freedom, the question becomes: when the second pair is proven to be zomemin, how much do they pay? The discussion hinges on whether the psak beis din (court ruling) from the first testimony remains in effect or becomes batel (nullified).
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Bava Kamma 64b
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