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When a husband appoints ten agents to deliver a divorce and then revokes one's authority, can the others still deliver? The shiur analyzes the machlokes between Rebbe and Rabban Shimon Gamaliel on whether revoking one agent invalidates the entire appointment (eid batel miktzata batel kulah). The discussion explores whether invalidation stems from violating beis din directives or from a protective takana against mamzeirus.
This shiur examines Gittin 33a-b, focusing on a fundamental dispute about the power to revoke agency for get delivery. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a case where a husband appoints ten agents to deliver a divorce document and subsequently attempts to revoke the appointment of one agent without the others present (zeh shelo bifnei zeh). According to Rebbe, such revocation is valid and effective, while Rabban Shimon Gamaliel holds it is not. The Gemara explains that the underlying disagreement centers on the principle of eid batel miktzata batel kulah—whether invalidating one agent from a group necessarily invalidates all of them. Rebbe holds that invalidating one does not invalidate the entire group, so the remaining nine agents can still deliver the get without concern. Rabban Shimon Gamaliel, however, maintains that eid batel miktzata batel kulah—revoking one invalidates all—creating a potential problem if the remaining agents, unaware of the revocation, proceed to deliver the get.
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Gittin 33a-b
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