A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
When a husband appoints ten agents to deliver a divorce and then revokes one's authority, can the others still deliver? The shiur analyzes the machlokes between Rebbe and Rabban Shimon Gamaliel on whether revoking one agent invalidates the entire appointment (eid batel miktzata batel kulah). The discussion explores whether invalidation stems from violating beis din directives or from a protective takana against mamzeirus.
This shiur examines Gittin 33a-b, focusing on a fundamental dispute about the power to revoke agency for get delivery. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a case where a husband appoints ten agents to deliver a divorce document and subsequently attempts to revoke the appointment of one agent without the others present (zeh shelo bifnei zeh). According to Rebbe, such revocation is valid and effective, while Rabban Shimon Gamaliel holds it is not. The Gemara explains that the underlying disagreement centers on the principle of eid batel miktzata batel kulah—whether invalidating one agent from a group necessarily invalidates all of them. Rebbe holds that invalidating one does not invalidate the entire group, so the remaining nine agents can still deliver the get without concern. Rabban Shimon Gamaliel, however, maintains that eid batel miktzata batel kulah—revoking one invalidates all—creating a potential problem if the remaining agents, unaware of the revocation, proceed to deliver the get.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Gittin 33a-b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
