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Is kofer a payment for damages caused by one's ox, or a criminal fine to atone for death-by-heaven liability? The shiur develops a fundamental machloket between Rashi (רש"י) and the Rambam (רמב"ם): Rashi treats kofer as murder-by-proxy requiring full mu'ed certainty, while the Rambam frames it as liability for negligently keeping a dangerous animal—making mu'ed l'adam possible even from mu'ed l'behema.
This shiur explores the fundamental nature of kofer—the payment required when one's ox kills a person—through an analysis of a deep machloket between Rashi (רש"י) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) on Bava Kamma 2b. Rabbi Zweig frames the central question: Is kofer simply another form of damages (nezikin) similar to property damage, or is it fundamentally a criminal payment tied to the owner's culpability for death? The shiur begins by examining the Rambam's seemingly contradictory rulings in Hilchot Nizkei Mamon. In Perek 6:8, the Rambam rules that mu'ed l'adam (forewarned regarding people) is not mu'ed l'behema (forewarned regarding animals). Yet in Perek 10:3, when discussing kofer liability, the Rambam allows that an ox that gored three animals becomes mu'ed, and if it then kills a person, the owner pays kofer. This appears contradictory—how can killing animals establish mu'ed status for killing people if mu'ed l'adam is distinct from mu'ed l'behema?
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Bava Kamma 2b
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
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