No community start suggestion yet.
What makes testimony on a get acceptable from a single witness? The Gemara (גמרא) addresses whether testimony on the validity of a get is testimony about the get itself or about the divorce. Rabbi Zweig explores competing interpretations from Tosafot, the Nesivas, and Rav Kivegar regarding chazaka, dover shebe'erva, and when two chazakos can combine against one.
This shiur analyzes Gittin 2a's fundamental discussion of why a single witness (eid echad) is believed regarding the validity of a get (bill of divorce). The Gemara (גמרא)'s progression appears puzzling: it states that one witness is believed concerning isurim (forbidden matters), then asks about chazaka (established status), and introduces dover shebe'erva (matters requiring two witnesses). The shiur explores why the Gemara doesn't simply answer with either chazaka or dover shebe'erva alone. Tosafot raises a critical question: if the answer is dover shebe'erva, why does the Gemara need to mention chazaka at all? Why not go directly to dover shebe'erva? This question frames the entire analysis. The shiur examines whether testimony about a get is testimony on the document itself or testimony enabling divorce, and whether a get has independent halachic reality or exists solely as an instrumentality of divorce.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Gittin 2a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
