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Is the verbal declaration ("harei at mekudeshes li") in kiddushin merely to inform the woman of the husband's intent, or is it an integral part of the kinyan itself? The shiur explores Rashi (רש"י)'s formulation that places the giving before the saying, suggesting the amira creates the challos kiddushin rather than simply clarifying it. This contrasts with the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s approach, with implications for the nature of kiddushin through kesef versus shtar.
The shiur opens with an analysis of Rashi (רש"י)'s formulation on Kiddushin 2a regarding the different expressions used for kiddushin: "harei at mikudeshes li" (for kesef and shtar) versus "hiskachi li" (for biah). Rabbi Zweig suggests that by biah, both parties participate jointly in creating the kiddushin, hence the reflexive language. By kesef, the husband performs the entire action and the wife passively accepts. However, the Gemara (גמרא) also uses "hiskachi li" for kesef when discussing "mon ha-holech" (counting money), where the woman holds part of the money and could refuse before completion, making her an active participant. A major focus is the order of events in Rashi: it appears that the nisuin (giving) precedes the amira (verbal declaration), contrary to logical expectation. Rashi says "nosen la kesef she-haveh kesef omer lo harei at mikudeshes li," suggesting he gives first, then speaks. The Rambam (רמב"ם), by contrast, says first "omer lo harei at mikudeshes li" and then "ve-nosen la befnei edim." This is the practical way we perform kiddushin today.
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Kiddushin 2a
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