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Can a woman be mekudeshes using a dialect understood only in one region when the kiddushin occurs elsewhere? The Gemara (גמרא) rules that saying "charufa" (the Yehuda term for erusin) is invalid outside Yehuda, leading the Mishnah (משנה) Berurah to argue language must match location even for kiddushin. The shiur challenges this ruling: since kiddushin doesn't require formal speech—only mutual intent—why shouldn't it work when all parties understand, like a sukkah b'sunya?
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 6a, which discusses whether a woman can be mekudeshes using the term "charufa," a word used in Yehuda to mean erusin (betrothal). The Gemara (גמרא) states that if someone says "charufa" in Yehuda, she is mekudeshes because that is the local term for betrothal. However, the Gemara implies that outside Yehuda—such as in the Galil—this term would not create a valid kiddushin, even though the parties might understand the intent. The Mishnah (משנה) Berurah (Hilchos Krias Shema, section 62) derives from this Gemara a far-reaching principle: a language is only valid in the location where it is spoken. He applies this to Krias Shema, ruling that one cannot be yotzei Krias Shema in English while in France, because English is not the language of France. Only the local language has halachic validity in that location. The Mishnah Berurah brings proof from this Gemara in Kiddushin: just as "charufa" is invalid outside Yehuda, so too any language is invalid outside its native region.
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Kiddushin 6a
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