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Does the *hekesh* between divorce and marriage (v'yatzah v'chaysa) extend to all aspects of both, or only to the shtar itself? The shiur explores whether the Baal Itur's position (mechubar is invalid for kiddushin) assumes the requirement derives from *nissan* (the act of giving), while the Rashba's lenient view assumes it derives from *sefer* (the document itself). A fundamental chakira in defining the scope of havaya l'yetziya emerges.
The Gemara (גמרא) on Kiddushin 9a-b discusses whether kesef (money) used for kiddushin requires "lishma" (intent for a specific purpose). The Gemara establishes that kesef does not need lishma, even though a get (divorce document) does. This raises a fundamental question: if we make a *hekesh* (comparison) between havaya (marriage) and yetziya (divorce) through the principle of "v'yatzah v'chaysa," why doesn't kesef kiddushin require lishma just as a get does? Rashi (רש"י) explains that the hekesh operates specifically between shtar (document) of get and shtar of kiddushin—the Gemara prefers the hekesh of "havaya l'yetziya" (marriage to divorce) over "havaya sla dodi" (one aspect of marriage to another). This means that whatever the document of divorce requires, the document of marriage requires, but this doesn't extend to kesef kiddushin because kesef is fundamentally different—you acquire through value (*meshaveh*), not the object itself.
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Kiddushin 9a-b
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