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Does the *hekesh* between divorce and marriage (v'yatzah v'chaysa) extend to all aspects of both, or only to the shtar itself? The shiur explores whether the Baal Itur's position (mechubar is invalid for kiddushin) assumes the requirement derives from *nissan* (the act of giving), while the Rashba's lenient view assumes it derives from *sefer* (the document itself). A fundamental chakira in defining the scope of havaya l'yetziya emerges.
The Gemara (גמרא) on Kiddushin 9a-b discusses whether kesef (money) used for kiddushin requires "lishma" (intent for a specific purpose). The Gemara establishes that kesef does not need lishma, even though a get (divorce document) does. This raises a fundamental question: if we make a *hekesh* (comparison) between havaya (marriage) and yetziya (divorce) through the principle of "v'yatzah v'chaysa," why doesn't kesef kiddushin require lishma just as a get does? Rashi (רש"י) explains that the hekesh operates specifically between shtar (document) of get and shtar of kiddushin—the Gemara prefers the hekesh of "havaya l'yetziya" (marriage to divorce) over "havaya sla dodi" (one aspect of marriage to another). This means that whatever the document of divorce requires, the document of marriage requires, but this doesn't extend to kesef kiddushin because kesef is fundamentally different—you acquire through value (*meshaveh*), not the object itself.
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Kiddushin 9a-b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
