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Does an eved nirtzah (Hebrew servant who chooses perpetual servitude) eat terumah? The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s distinction between kinyan shanim (time-limited acquisition) and kinyan olam (perpetual acquisition). Rashi (רש"י) establishes that even nirtzah is not guf hakoneh like an eved Canaani, yet the Torah (תורה)'s double language ("toshav" and "sachir") teaches that nirtzah—though serving forever—still doesn't eat terumah, revealing the parameters of employment versus ownership.
The Gemara (גמרא) on Kiddushin 4a discusses whether an eved Ivri (Hebrew servant) who becomes nirtzah—choosing to serve his master permanently—may eat terumah. The central tension is understanding the kinyan (legal acquisition) status of such a servant. The shiur begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s position that an eved Ivri, even one who is nirtzah, is not a guf hakoneh (bodily acquisition) like an eved Canaani (Canaanite slave). The master does not own the servant's body and cannot sell him. This is explicit in Rashi and fundamental to the entire discussion. The Gemara uses the Torah (תורה)'s double language—"lo toshav v'lo sachir"—to teach that neither a toshav nor a sachir eats terumah. The shiur explores why the Torah uses this redundant formulation rather than stating the halacha (הלכה) directly. One possibility is that the Torah could have written it as a milsa d'asi b'kal v'chomer (a law derivable through logical inference): if a nirtzah doesn't eat terumah, certainly a sachir (hired worker) doesn't eat. Instead, the Torah writes both explicitly using the formulation "ka zeh v'lo mi'al zeh" (like this and not like that).
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Kiddushin 4a
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