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When a man divorces an ervah and then marries a new wife, does that new wife become forbidden as a tzarah of the original ervah? The shiur explores Rashi (רש"י)'s treatment of tzaras achos isha mishenas geirushah and probes whether shum rishonah mapil extends to tzaros acquired after the divorce. A novel possibility emerges: perhaps divorce doesn't fully sever the relationship, leaving a residual connection that still creates a tzarah.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Yevamos 13b concerning the principle of tzaras achos isha mishenas geirushah—the tzarah of a woman who became forbidden through divorce. The core question is whether a woman who marries a man after he has divorced an ervah (forbidden relative) is considered a tzarah to that original ervah, and whether such a tzarah would be forbidden from yibum. Rabbi Zweig begins by analyzing Rashi (רש"י)'s explanation of why the tzarah of a woman who was divorced (achos isha mishenas geirushah) is permitted. Rashi invokes the principle of "tzarah shum rishonah"—that she wasn't directly connected to the ervah during the original marriage. The fundamental question is what creates a tzarah relationship: does it require simultaneous marriage, or can a tzarah relationship be created even after the ervah has been removed from the picture?
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Yevamos 13b
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