A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Can a woman become betrothed through money given to a third party? The Gemara (גמרא) on Kiddushin 6b says yes, treating the man as a guarantor (orev). Rashi (רש"י) holds the betrothal works with the actual money, while Rishonim like Tosafos (תוספות) Rid and the Rambam (רמב"ם) insist it only works "b'hai hano'ah" — with the benefit of having someone listen to you. The shiur explores what each side must explicitly say for the kiddushin to be valid.
The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא) on Kiddushin 6b, which discusses a case where a woman says "Give money to Ploni (a third party) and I will be betrothed to you." The Gemara rules she is betrothed through the principle of "orev" (guarantor): even though the woman herself never physically received the money, the man becomes liable to her like a guarantor, and this obligation creates a valid kiddushin. Rabbi Zweig opens with a fundamental question: Why do we need a special din of orev for this case? Ordinarily, if someone asks you to perform a service or spend money on their behalf, you are entitled to payment without any formal kinyan or special legal construct. If I tell you to paint my house, you spend money on paint and labor, I owe you — no pasuk needed. So why does the Gemara invoke a special halachic category (orev) to explain the kiddushin? What makes this case different?
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 6b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
