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Why doesn't the principle that 'one witness is believed regarding prohibitions' apply to validate a get? The shiur develops how the Gemara (גמרא)'s two answers - chazakah de'isura and davar sheb'ervah - both turn on what exactly the witness testifies about: the woman's marital status or just the document's technical validity.
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of the sugya in Gittin 2a concerning the requirement for witnesses (eidim) when validating a get (religious divorce document). The Gemara (גמרא) initially suggests that just as all testimony (eduyot) in the Torah (תורה) requires two witnesses, so too should testimony about a get's validity require two witnesses. However, the Gemara then rejects this comparison by introducing the principle of 'eid echad ne'eman be'isurin' - that one witness is believed regarding matters of ritual prohibition. The Gemara provides two main reasons why the standard requirement for two witnesses doesn't apply here: First, the case involves 'chazakah de'isura' - the woman has an established status of being a married woman (eshes ish), and one witness cannot remove such an established prohibition. Second, this constitutes 'davar sheb'ervah' - matters relating to sexual prohibitions, which require two witnesses based on a gezeirah shavah from sotah.
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Gittin 2a
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