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Why does Abaye hold that a shifcha sold as a minor doesn't go free when she becomes a bogeres through aylonus, even though she retroactively becomes a gedolah? The shiur distinguishes between gadlus (halachic adulthood at a specific age) and maturity (physical development). Only maturity, not gadlus alone, can remove a girl from the reshus of the adon.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kiddushin 4a regarding when an amah ivriah (Jewish maidservant) goes free. The central problem is a contradiction: Abaye holds that a shifcha doesn't go free when she becomes a bogeres through aylonus (late physical maturity at age twenty), yet we know that when an aylonis turns twenty, she retroactively becomes a gedolah from age twelve. If she's retroactively a gedolah from twelve, how could the father have sold her at all? The entire sale should be invalid (mecher taus), since the father has no rights over a gedolah. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a kal vachomer from Mar bar Rav Ashi: if simanim (signs of maturity) at the normal age of naris (twelve) takes a girl out of the reshus of the adon, then certainly bagrus (becoming a bogeres) should take her out, since bagrus removes her from the father's reshus while simanim does not. Yet Abaye holds she doesn't go free with bagrus in the case of aylonus. What is Abaye's reasoning?
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Kiddushin 4a
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