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The Gemara (גמרא) asks: from where do we know that juxtaposed verses (semuchim) teach a halachic relationship? The shiur examines multiple approaches in the Rishonim—Rashi (רש"י), Rambam (רמב"ם), Tosafot, and Rashba—to how semuchim work in the case of Yevamos 4a, where lo sachsom shor ("do not muzzle an ox") is adjacent to the laws of yibum. Does juxtaposition mean reconciling conflicting laws, or does it mean absorbing one law into the other?
This shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא) in Yevamos 4a, which addresses a fundamental question: from where in the Torah (תורה) do we derive that juxtaposed verses (semuchim) teach us substantive halachic relationships? The Gemara brings two examples: the juxtaposition of shaatnez (the prohibition of wearing wool and linen) with tzitzis, and the juxtaposition of lo sachsom shor b'disho (the prohibition of muzzling an ox while it threshes) with the laws of yibum (levirate marriage). Rabbi Zweig opens by questioning why the Gemara needs a special limud (derivation) for semuchim at all. If the principle of ein mukdam u'meuchar baTorah—that the Torah is not written in chronological order—is already established, then the very fact that two parshiyos are written next to each other should automatically signal a relationship. The answer suggested is that semuchim must be a subdivision of gezeirah shavah, a method of comparison that requires its own independent source. While gezeirah shavah compares similar words across different contexts, semuchim compares adjacent passages and requires us to read them in conjunction.
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Yevamos 4a
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