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Can witnesses on a document (eidim b'shtar) be subject to kasha zomam (conspiring witness laws)? The Rif and Baal HaMaor dispute whether the date testimony of witnesses on a shtar creates liability for kasha zomam. Rabbi Zweig argues that kasha zomam requires the witnesses themselves to establish the facts and credibility of their testimony—not merely that they can be punished—and this explains why a postdated shtar (shtar me'uchar) lacks sufficient drisha v'chakira despite being kosher.
This shiur addresses a fundamental dispute between the Rif and the Baal HaMaor regarding whether there is a din of kasha zomam (conspiring witnesses) in the case of eidus b'shtar (testimony embedded in a document). The Rif maintains that if witnesses on a shtar are explicitly made (confronted with testimony) that they signed the document on the specific date written in the shtar, there is a din of kasha zomam—they can be subject to the laws of conspiring witnesses. The Baal HaMaor, however, argues that even if it is written in the shtar that the witnesses signed on that particular day, there is no din of kasha zomam on eidus b'shtar; this law applies only to eidus al peh (oral testimony). Rabbi Zweig presents the Rashba's understanding that according to the Rif, kasha zomam is only possible if it is explicitly written in the shtar that the signing took place on the stated day. The Rambam (רמב"ם) and Rif both hold that as long as the witnesses testified (even orally) that they signed on that day, they can be subject to kasha zomam. The scenario involves a shtar where Reuven owes Shimon money; when Shimon brings it to beis din and Reuven claims it is forged, the witnesses must affirm not only their signatures but also the date of signing to enable kasha zomam.
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Bava Kamma 73a
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