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When a husband contests a get's validity, is that a safek de'oraisa or a vadai prohibition? The Gemara (גמרא) suggests eid echad suffices for kiyum, yet the Rambam (רמב"ם) rules that if the baal is me'ar (contests) and the get cannot be verified, she is vadai not divorced. The shiur challenges the Lechem Mishneh's reading and proposes that eid echad transforms the husband's claim into a mere safek, not a de'oraisa fact.
This shiur analyzes Gittin 3a and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position on what happens when a husband contests the validity of a get. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that kiyum shtar (validation of documents) requires two witnesses de'oraisa but concludes that gittin need only one witness mid-rabbanan. The question arises: if the baal later claims the get is forged (mezuyaf), what is the halachic status of that claim? The Lechem Mishneh raises a fundamental difficulty on the Rambam. The Gemara seems to accept that eid echad is sufficient for kiyum of a get, suggesting this is only a din derabbanan. Yet when the Rambam discusses a case where the baal contests the get and it cannot be verified, he rules that the woman is vadai not divorced—a din de'oraisa. How can the Gemara say eid echad works if the underlying problem (the baal's ir'ur) is de'oraisa? An eid echad should be ineffective against a de'oraisa claim.
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Gittin 3a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
