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When a husband contests a get's validity, is that a safek de'oraisa or a vadai prohibition? The Gemara (גמרא) suggests eid echad suffices for kiyum, yet the Rambam (רמב"ם) rules that if the baal is me'ar (contests) and the get cannot be verified, she is vadai not divorced. The shiur challenges the Lechem Mishneh's reading and proposes that eid echad transforms the husband's claim into a mere safek, not a de'oraisa fact.
This shiur analyzes Gittin 3a and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position on what happens when a husband contests the validity of a get. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that kiyum shtar (validation of documents) requires two witnesses de'oraisa but concludes that gittin need only one witness mid-rabbanan. The question arises: if the baal later claims the get is forged (mezuyaf), what is the halachic status of that claim? The Lechem Mishneh raises a fundamental difficulty on the Rambam. The Gemara seems to accept that eid echad is sufficient for kiyum of a get, suggesting this is only a din derabbanan. Yet when the Rambam discusses a case where the baal contests the get and it cannot be verified, he rules that the woman is vadai not divorced—a din de'oraisa. How can the Gemara say eid echad works if the underlying problem (the baal's ir'ur) is de'oraisa? An eid echad should be ineffective against a de'oraisa claim.
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Gittin 3a
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