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Does kiddushin require explicit speech (dibur), or does intent suffice when they're engaged in the matter (asukim b'oso inyan)? The Gemara (גמרא)'s question about whether yad (implied language) applies to kiddushin reveals that even though mutual intent exists, proper articulation matters—yet saying the wrong words after proper kiddushin language may not constitute retraction if clarification was still needed.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental question in Kiddushin 6a regarding whether the principle of yad (implied intent) that applies to nedarim (vows) also applies to kiddushin (betrothal). The Gemara (גמרא) asks: if one says "harei at mekudeshes li v'at" (you are betrothed to me and you), does "v'at" mean "and you too" (extending to a second woman) or "and you also" (merely emphasizing the first woman)? This question presupposes that yad—where we understand intent even without explicit language—might apply to kiddushin. Rabbi Zweig presents a powerful question from Rabbeinu Chaim HaLevi (as cited in Birkas Shmuel): The Gemara establishes that when people are "asukim b'oso inyan" (engaged in discussing a particular matter), even silence (shtika) can effectuate kiddushin—no words are needed at all. If so, how can the Gemara even have a question about whether yad works for kiddushin? If both parties want to marry and their intent is clear, why should it matter whether the exact language is perfect? The very premise of the Gemara's inquiry seems contradictory.
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Kiddushin 6a
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