No community start suggestion yet.
The shiur analyzes Yevamos 7b on whether partial entry into the Temple (biya b'miktzas) constitutes a full entry or merely contact. Two models emerge: partial entry redefines what "entry" means (and is thus explicit in the Torah (תורה)), or it establishes a separate halacha (הלכה) of contact (negiah). The Gemara (גמרא)'s principle of "kol d'ishtri ishtri" depends on which issur was established first and whether one issur builds upon another.
The shiur opens by examining the Tosfos on whether the prohibition of a tamei person entering the Temple applies to partial entry (biya b'miktzas). The question is whether the hekesh teaching that partial entry is prohibited creates a second, separate halacha (הלכה) or merely defines what constitutes "entry" (biya). If it's a definition, then biya b'miktzas is explicitly stated in the Torah (תורה) (meforash b'Torah), but if it's a separate halacha, it is not meforash. Rabbi Zweig develops two fundamentally different understandings. The first approach holds that biya b'miktzas means you are actually inside the Temple—the hekesh redefines the measure (shiur) of what constitutes entry. Just as rosh v'rubo establishes the threshold for birth or shechita, here miktzas defines the threshold for entry. Under this reading, the issur is meforash b'Torah because the hekesh explains the plain meaning of the pasuk "l'mikdash lo yavo."
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Yevamos 7b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
