No community start suggestion yet.
The shiur analyzes Yevamos 7b on whether partial entry into the Temple (biya b'miktzas) constitutes a full entry or merely contact. Two models emerge: partial entry redefines what "entry" means (and is thus explicit in the Torah (תורה)), or it establishes a separate halacha (הלכה) of contact (negiah). The Gemara (גמרא)'s principle of "kol d'ishtri ishtri" depends on which issur was established first and whether one issur builds upon another.
The shiur opens by examining the Tosfos on whether the prohibition of a tamei person entering the Temple applies to partial entry (biya b'miktzas). The question is whether the hekesh teaching that partial entry is prohibited creates a second, separate halacha (הלכה) or merely defines what constitutes "entry" (biya). If it's a definition, then biya b'miktzas is explicitly stated in the Torah (תורה) (meforash b'Torah), but if it's a separate halacha, it is not meforash. Rabbi Zweig develops two fundamentally different understandings. The first approach holds that biya b'miktzas means you are actually inside the Temple—the hekesh redefines the measure (shiur) of what constitutes entry. Just as rosh v'rubo establishes the threshold for birth or shechita, here miktzas defines the threshold for entry. Under this reading, the issur is meforash b'Torah because the hekesh explains the plain meaning of the pasuk "l'mikdash lo yavo."
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Yevamos 7b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
