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What does "hiskatsi li l'chetsi" (marry me to half of you) mean? The Gemara (גמרא) debates whether kiddushin requires the woman to be fully designated (miyuchad) for one man, or if the husband is merely acquiring her like an object. The Rambam (רמב"ם) holds there is a real din of chatzi ish—a woman can be designated to "half a man"—teaching that who the man is matters for the kiddushin itself.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kiddushin 7a, focusing on the seemingly bizarre statement "hiskatsi li l'chetsi" (marry me to half of you). Rabbi Zweig explores two fundamentally different approaches to understanding both the question and the answer in the Gemara (גמרא), which reflect a profound debate about the nature of kiddushin itself. The basic question is: what does it mean when someone says "hiskatsi li l'chetsi"—half of me wants to marry you? At first glance, this appears nonsensical. The Gemara explains it means "I want to marry someone else" (ibo nisavina achrit v'nisavina). But this explanation raises a deeper problem: since in kiddushin the man is koneh (acquires) the woman and she is not koneh to him, what difference does it make if he wants to marry someone else? When acquiring property, half of you can acquire the whole thing—the identity of the buyer is irrelevant. So why should it matter here?
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Kiddushin 7a
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