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Why is someone sitting on a bench liable when his weight combines with others to break it, yet someone who dug nine tefachim of a bor is exempt when another completes it to ten? The shiur contrasts Rashi (רש"י), the Tur, and the Rambam (רמב"ם) (via the Gaon of Vilna) on whether havalah v'saluk applies to continuous actions versus one-time actions, and explores the fundamental nature of koach k'gufo.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Bava Kamma 6b concerning liability when multiple people combine to cause damage. The core case involves five people sitting on a bench, and a sixth person sits down causing it to break. The Gemara (גמרא) asks why the sixth person is liable for the full damage when the first five could have stood up (havalah v'saluk). Rabbi Zweig opens by highlighting a fundamental question: Why does the principle of havalah v'saluk (the ability to remove oneself) apply differently in different contexts? When someone sits on a bench with others and his weight causes it to break, Rashi (רש"י) holds he can tell the earlier sitters they should have gotten up—even if the bench would not have broken without him. Yet when someone digs nine tefachim of a bor and another completes it to ten tefachim (the shiur that creates liability), the first digger is exempt. Why isn't there a requirement for the first digger to fill in his part?
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Bava Kamma 6b
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