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Can a man be mekadesh a woman with the unpaid ribbis portion of a loan? Rashi (רש"י)'s radical reading holds that ribbis does create a real obligation—even though it's asur to pay and asur to collect—because the extra money reflects the genuine economic value of the loan. The shiur distinguishes between changing loan terms (ribbis) and simply paying the lender not to press for collection (permitted).
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kiddushin 6b regarding whether a man can be mekadesh (betroth) a woman using the ribbis (interest) portion of a loan. The Gemara (גמרא) initially states that one who is mekadesh with a loan is not mekudeshes, citing the principle that a loan is given to be spent (milveh l'hotzaah nitna), so there is no tangible object present at the moment of kiddushin. The Gemara then asks about a case of ribbis: if someone lent four and is owed five, can he be mekadesh with the extra zuz (the ribbis portion)? Rabbi Zweig presents Rashi (רש"י)'s revolutionary interpretation, which flies in the face of basic assumptions about ribbis. Rashi holds that the woman IS mekudeshes, even though the extra zuz is ribbis and therefore asur to pay and asur to collect. This raises a fundamental question: how can there be kiddushin when there is no legal obligation to pay the ribbis? If paying ribbis is forbidden, collecting it is forbidden, and even writing a shtar obligating oneself in ribbis is forbidden (to the point that witnesses who sign such a document become pasul for eidus), how can there be a chiyuv (obligation) that creates a valid kiddushin?
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Kiddushin 6b
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