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Can a man be mekadesh a woman with the unpaid ribbis portion of a loan? Rashi (רש"י)'s radical reading holds that ribbis does create a real obligation—even though it's asur to pay and asur to collect—because the extra money reflects the genuine economic value of the loan. The shiur distinguishes between changing loan terms (ribbis) and simply paying the lender not to press for collection (permitted).
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kiddushin 6b regarding whether a man can be mekadesh (betroth) a woman using the ribbis (interest) portion of a loan. The Gemara (גמרא) initially states that one who is mekadesh with a loan is not mekudeshes, citing the principle that a loan is given to be spent (milveh l'hotzaah nitna), so there is no tangible object present at the moment of kiddushin. The Gemara then asks about a case of ribbis: if someone lent four and is owed five, can he be mekadesh with the extra zuz (the ribbis portion)? Rabbi Zweig presents Rashi (רש"י)'s revolutionary interpretation, which flies in the face of basic assumptions about ribbis. Rashi holds that the woman IS mekudeshes, even though the extra zuz is ribbis and therefore asur to pay and asur to collect. This raises a fundamental question: how can there be kiddushin when there is no legal obligation to pay the ribbis? If paying ribbis is forbidden, collecting it is forbidden, and even writing a shtar obligating oneself in ribbis is forbidden (to the point that witnesses who sign such a document become pasul for eidus), how can there be a chiyuv (obligation) that creates a valid kiddushin?
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Kiddushin 6b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
