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If someone sits down to eat without first taking the lulav, must they interrupt their meal? The Gemara (גמרא)'s debate centers on whether "yitol al hashulchan" imposes an issur achilah (prohibition to eat) or merely a mitzvah (מצוה) l'chatchilah to pause. Rashi (רש"י) reads Rav Zeira as fundamentally reinterpreting the Mishna: the obligation is only l'chatchilah—a precautionary measure (shema yishkach v'yivsha) rather than an absolute prohibition, applicable to d'rabbanan but perhaps not d'oraita obligations.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Masechta Sukkah (38a) concerning the halachic obligation to interrupt one's meal if one has not yet fulfilled the mitzvah (מצוה) of lulav. The Mishna states that if someone is on the road without a lulav, upon arriving home they should take it "al hashulchan" (at the table), and the lulav is valid all day. Rashi (רש"י) clarifies that "im shachach" means if one forgot—distinguishing between negligence (posheia), forgetfulness (shachach), and circumstances beyond one's control (oines). The Gemara (גמרא) asks a fundamental question: is there a contradiction between our Mishna, which seems to require interrupting a meal for lulav (a d'oraita obligation), and the din by Mincha, where the Gemara states "hischilu ein mafsik" (if they began eating, they need not interrupt)? Rashi explains that the case of "hischilu" refers to someone who started eating during the half-hour before Mincha when Chazal said one should not begin a meal, yet if one did begin, there is no requirement to interrupt.
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Sukkah 38a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
