No community start suggestion yet.
Who must give the money and say the declaration in kiddushin, and why? The Gemara (גמרא)'s cases of nasan hu v'amara hu, nasan hu v'amara hi, and nasan hi v'amara hi expose a fundamental question: Is amira (the verbal declaration) merely an explanation of what occurred, or is it the essential act of kiddushin itself? Rashi (רש"י) and the Rashba offer two radically different frameworks.
This shiur delivers a deep analysis of Kiddushin 5b, focusing on the Mishna's teaching about how a woman is acquired through kesef (money), shtar (document), or biah (relations), and the Gemara (גמרא)'s exploration of the role of amira (verbal declaration) in the act of kiddushin. The central question is whether amira is merely a way to clarify what transpired, or whether it is the core maaseh kiddushin itself. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s approach to the Mishna. Rashi explains that the Mishna is teaching the minimum requirements for the maaseh kinyan—the act of acquisition—not the full requirements for creating the chalos ishus (the legal status of marriage). According to Rashi, the kinyan kesef requires amira and an action (kesef or giving), but it does not require eidim (witnesses), because eidim are needed for the chalos ishus, not for the kinyan itself. Rashi holds that the Mishna is focused on how the kinyan works, not on how to create the complete marriage status.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 5b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
