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The Gemara (גמרא) presents contradictory inferences about whether kiddushin requires both giving *and* speaking by the man. Rashi (רש"י) offers two approaches: the first holds that amira is an essential component of the ma'aseh kiddushin (he didn't do enough); the second holds that her speaking ruins an otherwise valid kiddushin (she did something wrong). Tosfos challenges the Gemara's inquiry by asking why it didn't consider the reverse case.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 5b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of who must perform the giving (nesina) and the verbal declaration (amira) for kiddushin to be valid. The Gemara presents two Mishnayos that yield contradictory inferences (maskna d'arapah petaimi de nasan hu v'amar hu). The Reisha suggests that if he gave and she spoke (nasan hu v'amra hi), the kiddushin would not be valid. The Seifa, however, seems to suggest the opposite—that such an arrangement might work. Rabbi Zweig carefully unpacks the various possibilities for understanding why nasan hu v'amra hi might or might not be valid. On the side that it should be good, there are several approaches: (1) Perhaps the giving (nesina) is the essential element (ikur), and her speaking doesn't ruin anything; (2) Perhaps the principle of shtika k'hoda'a (silence is agreement) means that when he gives and is silent, it's as if he spoke too (nasan hu v'amar hu); (3) Perhaps a joint ma'aseh kiddushin—where both parties participate in the nesina and amira—could be valid.
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Kiddushin 5b
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