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Why does the Torah (תורה) need two pesukim—toshav and sochir—to exclude an eved from eating trumah? The shiur examines Rashi (רש"י)'s reading that one refers to an eved nirtza (kinyan olam) and the other to an eved sold for six years (kinyan shana), and asks why Rashi doesn't instead distinguish between mechiras bezdin and mechiras atzmo. The discussion introduces fundamental questions about ownership, guardianship, and the nature of kinyan.
This shiur addresses a series of fundamental questions on Kiddushin 4a concerning the sugyah of toshav v'sochir and the prohibition against an eved eating trumah. The Gemara (גמרא) presents the principle of bozeh v'limed al zeh: when two pesukim appear to teach the same din, each must teach a distinct case. Here, the Torah (תורה) says both "toshav" and "sochir" of a Kohen may not eat trumah. If only one were written, we might have thought it referred to the lesser chiddush (kinyan shana—a six-year sale). The second pasuk teaches that even kinyan olam (perpetual ownership, i.e., the eved nirtza) does not permit eating trumah. Rabbi Zweig opens with a fundamental kasha on Rashi (רש"י): Why does Rashi frame the two cases as (1) eved sold for six years and (2) eved nirtza? There are other possible distinctions. For instance, why not distinguish between an eved sold by beis din (mechiras bezdin) and one who sells himself voluntarily (mechiras atzmo)? Or between a six-year contract and a lifelong contract (mechiras olam)? Rashi specifically invokes the category of nirtza—the eved who chooses to remain after six years by having his ear pierced—but the Gemara could have drawn other lines. What compels Rashi to choose nirtza as the paradigm of kinyan olam?
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Kiddushin 4a
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