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Why can a husband annul his wife's vow of nezirus when nezirus involves Torah (תורה)-imposed obligations beyond her verbal commitment? The Gemara (גמרא)'s question reveals two fundamentally different understandings of hafar: the Ran views it as the husband's sovereign right to negate anything affecting him, while the Rambam (רמב"ם) sees it as one verbal commitment (hafar) canceling another (neder), which only works when the entire obligation stems from her words alone.
This shiur analyzes Nedarim 4b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s question about why we need a hekesh (textual analogy) to learn the laws of hafar (annulment of vows) for nezirus from nedarim. The Gemara asks: if hafar applies to nedarim, why not simply derive it through a kal vachomer (logical inference) for nezirus? The Gemara answers that one might have thought hafar only applies to nedarim because standard nedarim last forever (le'olam), creating significant burdens on the husband, whereas standard nezirus lasts only thirty days. The Rishonim struggle with this answer. Tosafos (תוספות) and the Ran note that nedarim can also be made for limited durations (like a week), yet hafar still applies. How do we know hafar works for short-term nedarim without the hekesh? They are forced into a difficult position: perhaps we only know about hafar for limited-duration nedarim after we learn it from nezirus through the hekesh, creating a circular dependency.
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Nedarim 4b
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