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Why is there a practical difference between an av melacha and its tolda? The shiur develops two models for understanding l'chalek yotzes: either thirty-nine separate issurim or a single issur of lo sa'aseh kol melacha with thirty-nine korbanos. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s statement that two toldos of different avos require "yearei" (possibly) one korban unlocks the question of whether toldos remain under the general lo sa'aseh kol melacha or derive from each specific av.
The shiur begins with the Mishna in Bava Kamma 2a, which lays out the fundamental distinction between an av (primary category) and a tolda (derivative) in the context of damages. The Gemara (גמרא) states that if someone performs two avos in one helam (period of forgetfulness), he is liable twice; similarly for two toldos. However, if one performs an av and its tolda together, one is liable only once. This leads to the question: what is the practical difference between calling something an av versus a tolda? Rabbi Zweig focuses on Rashi (רש"י)'s formulation, which states that when one does an av and its tolda, "lo mechuyav al achad"—one is not liable for the tolda. This is puzzling because the Gemara simply says one brings one korban, not that there is no liability for the tolda at all. Rashi appears to be saying something more significant: that the tolda liability is completely subsumed by the av. This would only make sense if we understand the relationship in a specific order—first doing the av, then the tolda—such that the tolda adds nothing new to the existing liability.
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Bava Kamma 2a
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